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Taliban, a movement of Afghan Pashtuns having cross-border affiliations, ruled Afghanistan between 
1996 and 2001. After September, 2001 the US military threw them out of power which reflected the 
decline of Taliban as a political and military power. Nevertheless, the existing politico-military 
scenario of Afghanistan establishes that Taliban have again gained the strength and posed a major 
challenge to the US and its coalition forces. Various national and trans-national factors and forces, 
e.g., poppy cultivation, Pakistani military, Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) and madrasas, weak and 
flawed US policies, illegal arms supply and weak Afghan government, have played a critical role in 
its resurgence. 
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Introduction
The Taliban…has the upper hand in 
the fight against Pakistani, Afghan 
and NATO forces.
 -Asif Ali Zardari (2008)
Since September 11, 2001, Afghanistan has 
received constant global attention. The destruction 
of World Trade Centre and Pentagon – economic 
and security centers – made Afghanistan a matter 
of grave concern for the United States of America 
(USA). In late nineties, Afghanistan was the 
victim of ‘donor fatigue’ (Sharma, 2008: 3). It 
was forgotten and neglected by the world. The 
United Nations made constant efforts to bring the 
derailed state back on the track, but went in vein. 
Taliban created a complete lawlessness, disorder 
and anarchy. Ideals of ‘democracy’ and ‘human 
rights’ were empty, hollow and meaningless. 
Nonetheless, circumstances changed vividly. The 
US launched ‘Operation Enduring Freedom’ with 
the help of North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
(NATO) to root out the Taliban regime, to 
democratize the state and, to have a long-term 
international effort to provide economic assistance 
for humanitarian relief and reconstruction of the 
country (Sharma, 2008: 3). The US led NATO 
forces crushed Taliban and initiated the UN 
sponsored political process aimed at unifying 
Afghanistan. A legitimate central government 
was formed on November 27, 2001, with Hamid 
Karzai as the Head of the Afghanistan Interim 
Authority (AIA) (Sharma, 2008: 2-3). Then, 
Karzai became the President of a democratically 
elected government. The formation of democratic 
government led to peace and stability in the 
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country. Nonetheless, Taliban have resurged 
since 2006 in the most areas of Afghanistan 
while regularly attacking the Government of 
Afghanistan, allied NATO forces participating 
in Operation Enduring Freedom, and NATO led 
International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) 
and creating lawlessness, disturbance, insecurity 
and instability. The present article analyses 
the historical background of Taliban, and is, 
primarily, focused on its resurgence since 2006. It 
also examines the reasons behind its resurgence. 
History of Taliban
The term ‘Taliban’ has been derived from 
an Arabic word ‘Talib’ which means ‘one who 
is seeking’. Generally, ‘Talib’ refers to ‘someone 
who is seeking religious knowledge’ or ‘a religious 
student’. In Pashto language, ‘Taliban’ also refers 
to ‘student’ (Mishra, 2008a: 28). Taliban are a 
Sunni Islamist and Pashtun movement that ruled 
Afghanistan between 1996 and 2001. They were 
removed from power by cooperative military 
efforts between The US led NATO forces and 
Northern Alliance. Taliban, currently, based in 
Federally Administered Tribal Areas of Pakistan 
(FATA), are engaged in guerrilla war against the 
Government of Afghanistan and allied NATO 
forces. They are making efforts to expand their 
operations and influence in Pakistan.
The Taliban movement which was headed 
by Mullah Mohammed Omar encompasses 
overwhelming majority of ethnic Pushtuns from 
Southern Afghanistan and Western Pakistan, 
along with a small number of volunteers from 
Islamic countries or regions in North Africa, 
Middle East and the former Soviet Union. Its 
emergence as a military and political power began 
in 1978. The Soviet occupation of Afghanistan 
inspired an American-led-counter-interventionist 
strategy which was implemented through Pakistan 
in support of the Afghan Islamic resistance forces 
commonly known as ‘Mujahideen’. The Soviets 
were forced to leave Afghanistan by the end of 
1980s. Their supported regime also collapsed in 
Kabul by the end of April 1992 (Katzman, 2008: 
4). The US, consequently, ended its involvement 
in Afghanistan with no due consideration to the 
post-communist management of the Afghan 
conflict. Afghanistan was left very much in 
‘tatters’, lacking ‘viable’ political, administrative 
and security structures (Saikal, 2002: 38). The 
Mujahideen Islamic Government that took over 
Kabul could not rapidly consolidate power. The 
Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) of Pakistan 
capitalized on its close friendship with the 
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) to generate 
a fresh and extremist Islamic fighting force. 
That force was the Taliban, which burst onto the 
Afghan scene with human, military and logistic 
support of Pakistan and with Saudi Arabia and the 
United Arab Emirates’ (UAE) financial backing. 
These states were traditionally friendly towards 
Pakistan and wanted some anti-Iranian lobby in 
Afghanistan. The CIA, and for that matter, the 
US government supported these developments 
in an apparent attempt to let Pakistan fill the 
power vacuum generated in post-communist 
Afghanistan. The US leadership viewed Taliban 
as beneficial to its interests. Militia’s anti-Iranian 
character and its ability to secure a direct corridor 
through Afghanistan into the newly independent 
and resource rich Muslim republics appeared 
appealing (Saikal, 2002: 38-39). 
The Taliban movement owed its emergence 
to the misrule of the Afghan Mujahideen. Taliban 
captured Herat in August, 1995 and Kabul in 
September, 1996. They controlled 90 percent of 
Afghan territory by the end of 1997 and pushed 
hard to capture the rest (Yusufzai, 2002: 105 and; 
Katzman, 2008: 4). The Taliban movement was 
a reaction to the cruelties and corruption of the 
Mujahideen commanders. They were forced to 
take the decision of ruling Afghanistan by moral 
degradation and loot activities of Mujahideens 
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that had become unbearable. The Afghans were 
fed up with the Mujahideens. They were ready to 
overthrow them and welcome Taliban (Yusufzai, 
2002: 102-103). An unstable and weak political 
condition and misrule by the Mujahideens, 
therefore, provided an opportunity to Taliban to 
emerge as the supreme power of Afghanistan and 
rule the country. 
Taliban regime, also known as ‘Islamic 
Emirate of Afghanistan’, gained diplomatic 
recognition from only three states, i.e. Pakistan, 
Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates. Under 
the leadership of Mullah Mohammed Omar and 
Mullah Obaidullah Akhund it established its 
close relationship with Al Qaeda, Hezb-e-Islami 
Gulbuddin, Islamic Emirate of Waziristan and 
Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan. They, initially, 
enjoyed enormous good will from the Afghans 
weary of corruption, brutality and incessant 
fighting of Mujahideen warlords. They opposed 
tribal and feudal structures and eliminated the 
traditional tribal and feudal leaders from the 
leadership roles. Since they were reluctant to 
share power and their ranks were overwhelmingly 
Pashtuns, their rule meant ethnic Pashtuns 
controlled multi-ethnic Afghanistan where 
Pashtuns made up only 42 percent of the total 
population (Katzman, 2008: 3). Taliban regime 
replaced all the senior Tajik, Uzbek and Hazara 
bureaucrats at national level with the Pashtuns 
without considering their qualifications. In local 
units of government like city councils of Kabul 
and Herat, Taliban loyalists dominated instead 
of locals even though the Pashto-speaking 
Taliban could not communicate with local 
Persian-speaking Afghans. Absence of local 
representation in the urban administration made 
Taliban appear as an ‘occupational force’. Like 
other Deobandis and Wahhabis, Taliban strongly 
opposed the Shia branch of Islam and declared 
Hazaras as non-Muslims. They established a new 
form of Islamic radicalism that spread beyond 
the borders of Afghanistan, mostly to Pakistan. 
Taliban were adverse to debate on doctrine with 
other Muslims (Encyclopedia, 2008: NP). They 
did not allow even Muslim reporters to question 
their edicts or to discuss interpretations of the 
Qur’an. They did not hold elections by arguing 
that the Shariat does not allow politics and 
political parties. They provided food, clothes, 
shoes and weapons instead of salaries to officials 
or soldiers. Jihad was declared as their right and, 
wished to recreate the time of the Prophet. Shariat 
law was interpreted to ban a variety of activities 
hitherto lawful in Afghanistan (Katzman, 2008: 
4-5). One Taliban list of prohibitions included 
employment and education of women, pork, pig 
oil, anything made from human hair, satellite 
dishes, cinematography and equipment that 
produced the joy of music, pool tables, chess, 
masks, alcohol, tapes, computers, television, 
videos, anything that propagated sex and was full 
of music, wine, lobster, nail polish, firecrackers, 
statues, sewing catalogs, pictures and Charismas 
cards (Encyclopedia, 2008: NP). Besides, keeping 
of pigeons, flying kites, western hairstyles 
and gambling were also prohibited. Men were 
required to have a beard extending farther than 
a fist clamped at the base of the chin. They had 
to wear their head hair short. These edicts were 
also implemented by Taliban style groups in the 
Pashtun belt of Pakistan and, to some extent, in 
Pakistan occupied Kashmir (PoK) (Encyclopedia, 
2008: NP). 
Most of the states in the world including 
Russia, Iran, India, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and 
Tajikistan and later, the US opposed the Taliban 
and supported its rival front which is known as 
‘the Northern Alliance’. The beginning of the 
end of the Taliban regime started when it shook 
hands with Osama Bin Laden and Al-Qaeda 
and allowed to perform its activities freely in 
Afghanistan. Osama Bin Laden started his 
activities against the United States. Earlier, the 
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US was supporter of Taliban. Reason being, 
Washington leadership hoped that Taliban would 
serve as a ‘force’ to restore order in Afghanistan 
after the long period of division into corrupt and 
lawless warlord fiefdoms. Therefore, the US did 
not react when Taliban captured Herat in 1995 
and expelled thousands of girls from schools. 
Nevertheless, the US hopes faded as it began to 
be engaged in warlords practices of rocketing 
unarmed innocent civilians targeting ethnic 
groups particularly Hazaras and restricting 
the rights of women. Madeleine Albright, US 
Secretary of States in 1997, began to distance the 
US from the Taliban. An American based Unocal 
Oil Company also withdrew from a deal with the 
Taliban government concerning an oil pipeline 
in 1998 (Encyclopedia, 2008: NP). In 1998, 
Taliban’s relations with foreign groups became 
much more acrimonious. Its forces killed several 
thousands of civilians after attacking the city 
of Mazar-e-Sharif. Ten Iranian diplomats and 
intelligence officers were also killed in the Iranian 
consulate. The Government of Iran was incensed 
and a full blown regional crisis ensued with Iran 
mobilizing 200,000 regular troops, though war 
was averted. A day before capture of Mazar-e-
Sharif Osama bin Laden’s associates bombed two 
US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania (Katzman, 
2008: 5). The US responded by launching cruise 
missiles attacks on the suspected terrorist camps 
in Afghanistan killing over 20 persons. Though, 
the US failed to kill Laden and other Al Qaeda 
leaders, Mullah Omar condemned the US missile 
attack and the US President Bill Clinton. Saudi 
Arabia expelled the Taliban envoy in Saudi Arabia 
in protest over the Taliban’s refusal to hand over 
Laden and after Mullah Omar allegedly insulted 
the Saudi Royal family (Encyclopedia, 2008: 
NP). The US National Security Council also 
unanimously voted to ban commercial aircrafts 
to and from Afghanistan and freeze its bank 
accounts worldwide. Taliban, further, isolated in 
March 2001 with the destruction of archeological 
treasures, the giant Buddha statues of 1500 
years old in Bamiyan (Katzman, 2008: 4). Al-
Qaeda attack on the USA on September 11, 2001 
destroyed the World Trade Centre and damaged 
a part of Pentagon, respectively in New York 
and Washington, D.C. In these attacks, the Twin 
Towers were completely destroyed. The whole 
world was stunned with this terrorist act of Al-
Qaeda. Hence responding to these attacks, the US 
leadership declared ‘the war against terrorism’ and 
delivered an ultimatum to the Taliban to extradite 
all Al Qaeda leaders to the US, to release all the 
imprisoned foreign nationals, to close all terrorist 
training camps, to hand over all terrorists and 
their supporters to appropriate authorities and to 
give full access to the United States to terrorist 
camps for inspection. Taliban decided not to 
extradite Osama bin Laden without evidence. The 
UAE and Saudi Arabia withdrew recognition of 
Taliban as the legal government of Afghanistan. 
The US along with its allies in NATO began its 
military pursuit ‘Operation Enduring Freedom’ 
against Taliban on October 7, 2001 and bombed 
Taliban and Al-Qaeda related camps (Mishra, 
2006: 29). The objective of military operation 
was to remove Taliban from power because of 
the Taliban refusal to the September 11 attacks, 
and disrupt the use of Afghanistan as terrorist 
base of operation. In the US air attacks hundreds 
of Mujahideens and thousands of civilians 
were killed which, ultimately, led to the end of 
the Taliban regime. Taliban gave up their last 
stronghold of Kandahar in early December, 2001 
and dispersed in various directions. 
Resurgence of Taliban
The US security forces were raining missiles 
and bombs on Iraq. But on the other hand, the 
state of affairs was taking a worse shape in 
Afghanistan. Taliban was regaining the strength 
(Cherian, 2003: 56). The Bush administration 
– 1197 –
Dr. Suneel Kumar. Resurgence of Taliban
had promised a ‘New Afghanistan’ after the 
removal of Taliban regime. But evidently the 
writ of the US supported government hardly 
runs beyond Kabul. It has been seven years 
since the end of Taliban regime in Afghanistan. 
But the picture has not changed much. After 
the fall of Taliban, between 2002 and 2005, the 
US and its allied forces fought relatively low 
levels of Taliban insurgent violence. The United 
States and Afghan troops conducted ‘Operation 
Mountain Viper’ in August, 2003, ‘Operation 
Avalanche’ in December, 2003, ‘Operation 
Mountain Storm’ in March-July, 2004, 
‘Operation Lightning Freedom’ in December, 
2004-February, 2005 and ‘Operation Pil’ in 
October, 2005 (Katzman, 2008: 21). After 
these operations it was assumed that Taliban 
movement had ended. 
The assumptions proved false. Taliban 
gained resurgence in most of the tribal areas. The 
incidents of ‘hit and run’ and suicidal attacks of 
Taliban have increased on a large scale. Only in the 
beginning of year 2006, 2300 people had died in 
Afghanistan. A total of 147 military personnel had 
died in 2006. Apart from this, till the first week of 
September, 2006 472 NATO and US soldiers 
were killed and 972 were injured (Anand, 2006: 
9). Increasing number of Afghanistan National 
Army and Afghan Police personnel were also 
killed in Taliban attacks. Between 2003 and 2006 
approximately 23 acts of suicide attack were held 
in Afghanistan (Roy, 2006:17). In May, 2006 a 
surge of Taliban attacks throughout Afghanistan 
left over 100 people dead. A number of suicidal 
bombings also took place during May 2006 in 
Ghazni and Herat (Roy, 2006:18 and; Anand, 
2006: 9-17). The US and its allied forces had only 
temporary successes in the major anti-Taliban 
military operations such as Operation Mountain 
Lion, Operation Mountain Thrust, Operation 
Medusa and Operation Silicon (Katzman, 2008: 
21-22).
The security condition in Afghanistan has 
deteriorated since 2006. Taliban unsuccessfully 
targeted the US Ambassador in central Unruzgan 
on January 5, 2006, killed a Canadian diplomat 
on January 15, 2006 in Kandhar, killed 21 Afghan 
civilians at Spin Boldak in the Southern Kandhar 
province and also attacked the vehicle of Afghan 
National Army on January 16, 2006, killing four 
soldiers and a civilian in Kandhar (Roy, 2006: 
17). Taliban have administrative and operational 
control over certain areas in Southern and Eastern 
Afghanistan. Its volunteers carried out its attacks 
from these areas. The most recent evidence of 
Taliban resurgence are the attacks of Taliban and 
its allies on a jail in Kandhar and Indian embassy 
in Kabul. On July 7, 2008, suicidal attackers tried 
to ram an explosive-laden vehicle through the 
gates of the Indian embassy in Kabul. After the 
blast there were 58 people killed and 170 were 
injured. The two Indian diplomats, the military 
attache, Brigadier Ravi Dutt Mehra, and political 
counselor, V. Venkateswara Rao, were also killed 
in this attack (Moss, 2008a :27 and; Cherain, 
2008:131-132). It was the deadliest attack in 
Afghanistan since a suicide bomber killed more 
than 100 people who were watching a dogfight 
contest in Kandhar province in February 2008. 
Two Indian security persons and six Afghan 
security personnel also died in this attack. The 
majority of the Afghan civilians who were killed 
had been queuing up for the Indian visas (Cherian, 
2008: 131-132). In another suicide attack, on July 
13, 2008, the Taliban attacked a highly fortified 
Jail in the Southern Afghan city of Kandhar. One 
suicide bomber drove in an explosive-laden water 
tanker through the main gate of Sarkoza prison 
while another struck the rear of the Jail compound 
wall. This was immediately followed by an attack 
on the prison, killing 15 security guards, by 30 
motorcycle borne guerillas. In this incident more 
than a thousand prisoners, including hard-core 
Taliban fighters, escaped (Cherian, 2008: 58). 
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To sum up, since 2006, as the incidents 
indicate, Taliban has gained revival in most parts 
of Afghanistan and, has emerged as a major 
source of disturbance, instability and violence. 
Factors Behind The Resurgence
Despite all the efforts of the US to nip the 
Taliban from Afghanistan, it is again gaining 
hold on Afghanistan. Recent attacks that killed 
thousands of people have proved its resurgence 
which is a severe ‘headache’ for the US and 
NATO forces. It is also an alarming sign for 
India. Taliban has resurged mostly in Southern 
Afghanistan. There are many actors and factors, 
for example, cultivation of poppy crop, Pakistani 
military and ISI, supply of illegal arms, Pakistani 
Madrasas, weak and flawed policy of the United 
States and lack of strong political authority 
in Afghanistan which have contributed to its 
resurgence.
Poppy Cultivation:
Poppy cultivation is the main reason behind 
resurgence of Taliban. Afghanistan which 
produces 93 percent of the world’s opium has a 
phenomenal growth in poppy production since 
2001. The crop is as popular as ever in the 
entire Southern Afghanistan including Helmund 
province. And 50 percent of the country’s opium 
production is credited to Helmund, the stronghold 
of the Taliban (Nooruzzaman, 2008: 10). The 
United Nations Office of Crime (UNODC) in 
the ‘Afghan Opium Survey, 2006’ discloses that 
Afghanistan has registered ‘highest production 
level ever recorded in Afghanistan’ accounting 
for almost 92 percent up from 87 percent in 2005 
of the world’s total illicit opium production. The 
area under poppy cultivation increased from 
104,000 hectares in 2005 to 165,000 hectares 
in 2006, an increase by 59 percent. Similarly, 
the potential opium production has increased 
by 49 percent from 4100 metric tons to 6,100 
metric tons (Chandra, 2008: 33-34). These facts 
establish that there has been a great rise in opium 
cultivation which is fueling Taliban Movement 
in Afghanistan. A large part of the income 
generated through poppy cultivation goes to the 
extremist movement. The extremists and private 
traders provide credit to the poppy farmers on 
easy terms and also help them in marketing their 
produce. Russian smugglers play a very crucial 
role in promoting the ‘destructive cause’ of the 
Taliban. These smugglers supply the Taliban 
activists, the arms and ammunition they need 
in exchange for opium (Nooruzzaman, 2008: 
10). Hence opium cultivation provides financial 
back up for Taliban. The price of heroin and 
opium is very high on international market. A 
kilogram of the best Afghan heroin is worth 600 
pounds in Afghanistan. It is worth twice as much 
at the bazaar in Tajikistan (Starkey, 2008: 11). 
But rather than take cash the Mujahideen take 
weapon parts because they double their value 
in Afghanistan. The drugs come mostly from 
Helmand where most of British troops are based. 
The opium grown there is turned into heroin in 
factories inside Afghanistan, sold into Tajikistan 
and smuggled into Europe. The guns are broken 
down into parts, smuggled back into Afghanistan 
and delivered to the Taliban. One kilogram of 
heroin can buy about 30 AK-47 assault rifles at 
the bazaar (Starkey, 2008: 11). 
The guns go straight to the Taliban 
frontline. The weapons on sale include machine 
guns, sniper rifles and anti-aircraft weapons. 
The trade is mostly done at a bazaar near old 
Afghan-Soviet border, deep in Tajikistan’s 
desert. The bazaar exists specifically to trade 
Afghan drugs for Russian guns. The Russian 
gangsters smuggle drugs into Britain and buy 
cheap heroin from Afghanistan and exchange 
it for guns. Smugglers never sell drugs for 
money. In fact, they exchange them for arms and 
ammunition (Starkey, 2008: 11).
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The United Nations Rapid Survey, 2008, 
divulges that Afghanistan produced 8,200 tons of 
opium in 2007. During the Najibullah regime in 
the 1980s, the average opium production was only 
around 300 tons annually (Bhattacharji, 2008: 
62). Although opium production has increased in 
recent years and the Afghan government has also 
failed in keeping check on opium cultivation. The 
government has also failed in capturing the opium 
from the country. In 2007 Iran seized 2, 31,352 
kilograms of Afghan opium while Afghanistan 
could siege only 90,990 kilograms. Afghanistan 
seized 9,079 kilograms of heroin while Pakistan 
seized 24,341 kilograms, Iran 12,493 kilograms 
and China 9,085 kilograms. Thus Afghanistan 
which produces 90 percent of the world’s opium 
and heroin seizes only 27 percent of the opium 
and 10 percent of the heroin (Bhattacharji, 2008: 
61-62). 
In brief, the cultivation of poppy and 
opium crops has played a significant role in the 
resurgence of Taliban. It has become the main 
financial source for Taliban militia against the 
Coalition forces in Afghanistan. 
Pak Military and ISI:
Pakistan’s military and the Inter-Services-
Intelligence (ISI) are playing a very crucial role 
in the resurgence of Taliban. They are providing 
them human, military and financial support. In 
other words, besides its emergence Pakistan is 
also supporting Taliban’s resurgence. The recent 
attack on Indian embassy in Kabul on July 7, 
2008 revealed the relations between Taliban and 
ISI. The US intelligence officials have concluded 
that elements of Pakistan’s military intelligence 
service provided logistical support to the 
militants who staged July 7, deadly car bombing 
at the Indian embassy in Kabul. The finding is 
based partly on unspecified communication 
intercepts (Warrick, 2008: 1). Deputy Director 
of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) has 
warned Pakistani officials that it need to do more 
to address dangerous ties between the country’s 
intelligence agency and Al-Qaeda linked 
militants who are growing in power in Pakistan’s 
tribal areas and elsewhere in the country (Mayer, 
2008: 8). The ISI has long been accused of 
arming, training and sponsoring the Taliban and 
other Islamist extremists, first in Afghanistan and 
more recently, in Pakistan and of using them as 
‘agents’ for spying in Afghanistan and violence 
in Kashmir (Mayer, 2008: 8). A Former Pakistani 
Ambassador, Karamatullah K. Ghori, writes:
Even if one were to give the benefit 
of doubt to Pakistan’s overarching 
and ubiquitous intelligence agencies 
for not directly bringing the 
Taliban into power in Afghanistan, 
it is an incontrovertible fact that 
it was the ISI that pampered the 
Taliban as the dejure government 
of Afghanistan and smoothed their 
way to get a stranglehold over 
Afghanistan. Extending official 
recognition to the Taliban as the 
dejure government of Afghanistan 
was a decision of the Pakistani 
intelligence outfit and not that of 
the Foreign Office (Ghori, 2007: 
18).
Similarly, Ijaz Ahmad Khan, an Assistant 
Professor at the Department of International 
Relations, University of Peshawar, Peshawar, 
views:
The Inter-Services Intelligence 
(ISI) had not only successfully 
advocated that it had warded 
off Pakistan Foreign Ministry’s 
attempt to close certain madressahs 
in the tribal agencies and near the 
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Afghan border, which have been 
the spawning grounds for Taliban 
hardliners (Khan, 2007: 156).
Historically, a strong and stable Afghanistan 
is not favoured by Pakistan. It was for only six 
years of Taliban reign from 1996 to 2001 in 
Afghanistan that Pakistan had some appearance 
of ‘strategic depth’ with the neighbour. Except 
for Taliban Government no other dispensation 
in Afghanistan has either been under Pakistan’s 
supervision or favorably disposed to it. A strong 
government in Afghanistan has always been a 
motivator for Pashtun and Baloch nationalism in 
Pakistan and has raised question on controversial, 
‘Durand line’, the borders between Pakistan and 
Afghanistan (Khan, 2007: 141). Pakistan has also 
exercised vision of extending the strategic depth 
to include Islamic state of Central Asia through 
Taliban held Afghanistan. Hence, Pakistan’s 
pro-Taliban policy has evolved and sustained 
to balance and counter the Indian influence in 
Afghanistan and make Afghanistan give up 
its claims over Pakistan territory. It supported 
various ethnic groups in Afghanistan opposed 
to Afghan government in 1974 and then in 1979 
built further on that particular support to oppose 
the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan. After a 
six year interregnum (1988-1994), in 1994, this 
support shifted to another religious group, the 
Taliban. This change was a ‘tactical adjustment’ 
(Khan, 2007: 141). For its own interests Pakistan 
continued to support Taliban. And even after the 
military coup, under General Pervez Musharraf 
its policy towards Taliban remained unaffected. It 
continued to view Taliban rule as the best possible 
means of achieving its goals in Afghanistan 
(Khan, 2007:155). Thus, domination of Taliban 
and Islamic groups in Afghan parliament would 
enable Pakistan to continue with its policies of 
contributing to instability in Afghanistan, and it 
is quite likely that it would persist with its agenda 
till the so called ‘moderate Taliban’ is installed in 
power (Anand, 2008:11).
The upsurge in Taliban operations has led 
to a war of words between Kabul and Islamabad. 
Afghanistan claims that Al-Qaeda leader Osama 
Bin Laden and top Taliban leaders are hiding 
somewhere in Pakistan tribal territory along 
the Afghan border (Roy, 2006: 14). Taliban’s 
enhanced capabilities are also primarily credited 
to the support coming from Al-Qaeda and from 
sections of Pakistani armed forces that are 
sympathetic to Taliban cause. 
While insurgent violence has increased 
across Afghanistan, governments in Kabul and 
Islamabad have been seen busy in ‘blame game’ 
over the level of Taliban activity and Osama 
bin Laden’s whereabouts. On May 18, 2006 
in Asadabad, the capital of Kunal province in 
Eastern Afghanistan, Afghan President Hamid 
Karzai charged Pakistani intelligence with 
providing military training and logistics to 
Taliban militants hiding in Pakistan and sending 
them to Afghanistan. He said:
Pakistan should understand that 
the days are long over gone when 
Afghan governments were made 
and unmade in Pakistan (Quoted 
in Roy, 2006: 15).
Apart from the military offensives against 
the coalition forces, Taliban is also serving as 
a ‘medium’ for the Pakistani establishment to 
indirectly convey the message that Islamabad 
will not tolerate any threat to its strategic 
interests in Afghanistan. The killing of Indian 
engineer Suryanarayana in April 2006 in 
Afghanistan by Taliban was an indirect warning 
from Islamabad to New Delhi not to get unduly 
involved in Afghanistan, particularly in the 
Southern parts of the country (Roy, 2006: 14-16). 
Pakistan has always supported rebel forces in 
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Afghanistan and is now supporting Taliban and 
its allies through Pak military and the ISI. The 
ISI is continuously arming and training Taliban 
militia mostly in NWFP. Afghan authorities have 
blamed Pakistan’s intelligence for the resurgence 
of Taliban forces. Islamabad has also been 
accused of involvement in the mass breakout 
of Taliban prisoners from the Kandhar central 
prison in June, 2008. After the most recent attack 
on the Indian embassy on July 7, 2008 in Kabul 
the Afghan government was quick to blame 
Taliban for the attack. The President’s official 
spokesperson, Humayun Hamidzada, further, 
indirectly accused the Pakistani intelligence 
agencies of ‘masterminding’ the attack. He told 
the media:
The sophistication of this attack 
and the kind of material that was 
used in it and the specific targeting 
everything has a hallmark 
conducted similar terrorist acts 
inside Afghanistan in the past. We 
have sufficient evidence to say that 
(Quoted in Cherian, 2008: 133-
134).
After the attack on a jail in Kandhar on 
July 13, 2008 President Hamid Karzai’s reaction 
was stronger than usual. He threatened to use 
force against Pakistan, blaming Islamabad for 
supporting Taliban attacks. He told the media in 
June that Afghanistan reserved the right to send 
its troops across the border into Pakistan. He 
stressed that it would be an act of ‘self defence’ 
because Taliban forces cross the territory from 
Pakistan to come and kill Afghans and Coalition 
troops (Cherian, 2008: 59). Failure of Pakistani 
forces to check the activities of Taliban leaders 
such as Jalaluddin Haqqani, who has a base in 
the tribal areas along the Pak-Afghan border, has 
angered both Kabul and Washington. Western 
military officials have told the American media 
that the Pakistan army was not capable of taking 
him on. The US political and military leadership 
has been airing its displeasure with Islamabad 
for its alleged ‘half-hearted’ attitude in fighting 
Taliban. General Dan K. McNeil, Commander 
of the NATO forces in Afghanistan stated in 
June, 2008 that stabilizing Afghanistan will 
be ‘impossible’ without a more robust military 
campaign against insurgent heavens in Pakistan 
(Cherian, 2008: 58). A study undertaken by the 
Research and Development Corporation (RAND) 
and funded by the US Department of Defence 
claimed in June, 2008 that elements in the ISI 
were aiding the Taliban. The NATO officials 
also disclosed several instances in which the 
ISI operatives provided intelligence to Taliban 
insurgents at the tactical operational and strategic 
levels (Cherian, 2008: 134). 
The strategic involvement of Pakistan in 
facilitating Taliban extended hospitality within 
its territory is well documented and widely 
commented. But there is no evidence as yet of 
any impact of the world’s pressure on Islamabad. 
This obviously indicates that the Pakistan-Taliban 
relationship is based on such vital calculations 
and expectations that even continuous pressure 
from the international community has proved 
to be ‘ineffective’ in convincing Islamabad to 
change its policy. The factor which “…forces the 
international community to repeatedly convince 
Islamabad to change its policy of supporting 
Taliban is the serious extent of destabilization 
that the increasingly resurgent Taliban are able to 
introduce into Afghanistan” (Mukarji, 2007:15).
These facts reveal that Pakistan has become 
asylum for ‘moderate Taliban militia’. It is 
providing both military and logistic support to 
Taliban through its military intelligence agency. 
Therefore, in order to promote its interests in 
Afghanistan, Pakistan is still fuelling the Taliban 
insurgency. 
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Weak and Flawed US Policy:
One of the strongest factors behind Taliban’s 
resurgence is the weak policy of United States. 
The weak and flawed US policy has let Taliban to 
grow again on Afghan soil. The major drawback 
of the US strategy is that it is mostly focused on 
judicial means, diplomatic pressure and a couple 
of attempted concealed military operations for 
only one purpose, i.e. to capture Osama bin 
Laden and his top aids (Saikal, 2002: 43). It failed 
to see that Laden and his Al-Qaeda network 
were closely tied with the Taliban and the ISI. 
Furthermore, the US leadership has also failed 
to understand that bin Laden virtually owned the 
Taliban by providing the militia with millions of 
dollars and thousands of Arab fighters and that 
there was little chance of taking out bin Laden 
and Al-Qaeda leaders without at the same time 
taking on Taliban and the ISI (Saikal, 2002: 43). 
It also paid only ‘transitory attention’ to the wider 
cruelties of these three forces against the Afghan 
people. 
Another aspect of strange and weak US 
policy is that Taliban has never been included 
either on the US State Department’s list of 
Foreign Terrorist organizations or on similar lists 
of its coalition allies even when the group has 
killed civilians, government officials, the US and 
NATO soldiers, besides Afghan army and police 
personnel. Therefore, in Afghanistan ‘double 
standards’ are being practiced by the United States 
in the interest of political expediency (Anand, 
2006: 12). Apart from this, it is also strange that 
America has made Pakistan its partner in its ‘war 
on terrorism’, which is also a ‘terrorist country’ 
(Anand, 2006: 12). The US has given about 10 
billion US dollars as aid to Pakistan to ‘fight 
against terrorism’. Pakistan is using it against 
India in Kashmir and also in Taliban’s insurgency. 
The US has also made Afghan civilians its rebels. 
Reason being, its military attacks have destroyed 
civilian’s homes. Further, many people have died 
in these attacks. Reportedly, since 2005 up to 
3,200 Afghan civilians have been killed in the 
US and NATO actions. But the compensation 
payouts have been far lower than in other global 
cases. The use of airpower is growing, raising 
the risks for civilians. Hence, between 2,699 and 
3,273 civilians were killed in direct actions by 
the external forces. By relying upon aerial close 
support, the US and NATO forces spare their 
pilots and ground troops but kill lot of innocent 
Afghan civilians. Air strikes are 4-10 times 
as deadly for Afghans civilians as are ground 
attacks. Moreover, the US military gives families 
of its victims at most 2,500 dollars as a condolence 
payment not ‘compensation which would admit 
wrong-doing. Canadian per person condolence 
payments to Afghans since 2006 ranged from 
1,100-9,000 dollars. This compares 1.85 million 
paid for victims of the 1988 bombing of a fight 
over Lockertrie, Scotland and 150,000 dollars 
per victim of a 1999 US bombing on the Chinese 
embassy in Belgrade that killed three Chinese 
and wounded 23 other people (Harold, 2008: NP). 
Subsequently Afghan people are helping Taliban 
to grow again against alien forces on their own 
soil (Anand, 2006: 12). 
Military campaign of the United States 
against Iraq has also helped Taliban to gain 
insurgency. As the US forces were raining 
missiles and bombs on the people of Iraq, the 
situation in Afghanistan was taking a turn for 
worse (Cherian, 2003:56). It is indeed ironical 
that even as the US and its allies praised Pervez 
Musharraf, former military dictator of Pakistan, 
as the ‘messiah’ who would eliminate terrorism. 
The Western media were inflicting heavy damage 
on his regime. Visits of the world leaders to 
Islamabad continued as if they had discovered a 
new world on the planet (Reddy, 2001:13). 
To sum up, Washington has trusted too 
much on Pakistan, which is the main problem 
of the US foreign policy. It has never tried to 
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understand that without destroying terrorist base 
in Pakistan, they cannot establish peace and 
stability in Afghanistan. Due to these reasons 
the US strategy has failed in Afghanistan that 
allowed Taliban’s resurgence.
Pakistani Madrasas:
The ‘War on Terrorism’ led by the United 
States in response to September 11 attack 
identified Islamabad educational institutions 
in general and madrasas in particular as one of 
the principal battlegrounds. These madrasas are 
also allowing Taliban’s survival. The US State 
Department spokesperson Richard Boucher in 
March 2002 expressed his concern about the 
spread of religious extremism in Pakistan. The 
comments by prominent US officials demonstrate 
that the link between madrasas and terrorism has 
become a matter of serious concern for the US 
administration (Mishra, 2006a:27). Madrasa, 
according to Encyclopedia of Islam, is ‘the 
name of an institution where Islamic sciences 
are studied’. Traditionally, a madrasa is a place 
of religious learning that has a long-standing 
history and has produced many religious scholars 
and reformists. The objective of madrasa is to 
introduce Muslim children to basic Quranic 
teachings, promote an Islamic ethos and groom 
students for religious duties (Mishra, 2006a: 27). 
These religious schools are associated with violent 
domestic turmoil and international terrorism. 
Some madrasas are breeding grounds for Islamic 
terrorists to carry on Jihad in Kashmir and other 
parts of the world. In fact, Pakistan government 
has also recognized their existence as factories of 
terror. An Interior Ministry Report of Pakistan, 
1995, speculates that about 10-15 percent of 
madrasas might have link with sectarian militancy 
or international terrorism. The same impression 
was provided by the report of the Human Rights 
Commission of Pakistan, 2001. One-third of 
these schools are, reportedly, providing military 
training to their students. Some madrasas send 
their students for training and participation in 
Afghan civil war without the knowledge of their 
parents. The Afghan civil war, Saudi funding 
and the Islamization policy of General Zia Ul 
Haq led to the mushroom growth of madrasas in 
Pakistan. In 1947 there were 137 madrasas in the 
entire country which had grown to 900 by 1971. 
With General Zia’s policy of generously funding 
the number rose to 8,000 registered madrasas 
and 25,000 unregistered madrasas, educating 
over half a million students during the Zia’s time. 
By the end of Zia Ul Haq’s regime in 1988 these 
madrasas became the principal source of education 
among the poor. By the middle of the year 2000 
the number of madrasas had grown nearly to 
9,500 registered and unregistered madrasas 
between 40,000 to 50,000. As Pakistan’s state 
run educational system steadily collapsed these 
madrasas became the only avenue for boys from 
poor families to receive the education (Mishra, 
2006: 28). The fundamentalists get education in 
these madrasas. And, therefore, these madrasas 
work as the ‘factories of jihad’ from where 
militants are produced and provide moral and 
material help to the Taliban.
Illegal Arms and Ammunition:
Illegal arms and ammunition have also 
served Taliban’s resurgence. The supply of illegal 
arms and ammunitions is mainly carried through 
Pakistan, Thailand, Cambodia, Tajikistan, 
Russia and China. China has emerged as the 
‘main supplier’ of old and new small arms and 
light weapons to Taliban and some of the North-
East insurgent groups. The reports reveal that 
China has replaced Thailand and Cambodia 
as the ‘traditional sources’ of small arms and 
light weapons (Mishra, 2008: 2). Earlier, the 
Asian black market of weapons was dominated 
by Thailand and Cambodia, but China has 
captured the market at present. Taliban forces 
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in Afghanistan have also been gaining access to 
Chinese arms. It is opined that the appearance of 
Chinese HN-5 MANPADS in Taliban’s inventory 
is a source of grave concern. The report clearly 
indicates that illegal arm supply is still fuelling 
Taliban’s insurgency. The whole network of arm 
supply is mainly carried through heroin and 
other drugs instead of money (Starkey, 2008: 11). 
Taliban forces export heroin and import arms 
through smuggling. The weapons on sale include 
machine guns, spiner rifles and anti-aircraft 
weapons. This trade is done at a bazaar near the 
old Afghan-Soviet Border in Tajikistan’s desert 
(Mishra, 2008, and Starkey, 2008: 11). Taliban has 
‘excellent weapons’ and ‘new field equipments’. 
They have new Improvised Explosive Devices 
(IED) technology and commercial communication 
(Borchgrave, 2008: NP). Taliban fighters use these 
illegal weapons against the US and NATO forces. 
Thus, the supply of illegal arms and ammunition 
has also strengthened Taliban.
Lack of Strong Political Authority
Absence of a strong political authority in 
Afghanistan provided favorable conditions for 
Taliban to strengthen their position. The US led 
‘Operation Enduring Freedom’ had crushed out 
Al-Qaeda and Taliban from Afghanistan. But in 
the absence of strong political authority, Taliban 
once again have appeared on the Afghan soil. 
Most of the Afghans consider President Hamid 
Karzai as a ‘puppet’ of the United States (Cherian, 
2003: 56). As Ahmed Rashid writes:
Many Afghans see President 
Hamid Karzai as an increasingly 
forlorn figure, trapped in the 
presidential palace as events 
spin out of his control, grasping 
for political straws to stern the 
widespread disillusionment with 
his government, begging the 
international community for more 
support (Rashid, 2008:17).
The composition of Afghan Parliament 
reveals that Islamists, Taliban leaders and 
warlords, dominate the national legislature. 
While 40 percent of representatives elected 
from Kabul have affiliations to former fighters 
and Mujahideens, their percentage raises to 
60 percent in the other provinces. Pashtuns 
secured 100 parliamentary seats out of 249 in 
the lower house. This has not prevented other 
groups from putting obstacles in the path 
of Afghan government’s agenda. The upper 
house of Afghan Parliament encompasses 
108 members out of which 68 are chosen by 
provincial councils. Besides, 40 members of the 
House are nominated by the President. Hence, 
being the Afghan President, Hamid Karzai has 
nominated a few members of controversial and 
‘questionable background’. This has also created 
complications and has adverse impact on the 
stability and security in Afghanistan. An elected 
parliament was expected to provide legitimacy 
and strength to the government. But a weak 
government in Kabul has been unable to assert 
itself and govern Afghanistan in a meaningful 
way (Anand, 2006: 9).  
The problem of governance, security, 
unemployment, opium cultivation and drug 
trafficking, absence of law and order and 
reconstruction remain the same even after 
the overthrow of Taliban regime. Present 
government has also failed to rebuild the shattered 
infrastructure including roads, electricity and 
water supply to wean the farmers from growing 
poppies (Rashid, 2008: 20). This weak situation 
of government has opened way for the resurgence 
of Taliban. The government has not established 
its authority or credibility. A quarter of teachers 
is illiterate. Bureaucrats lack most basic education 
and skills and have corrupt behaviour. People’s 
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contact with them is minimal. Afghan police is 
notoriously greedy and violent. In the South and 
East, along the Pakistani border, the vacuum 
of government has provided an opportunity for 
gangsters and Taliban. These are the areas where 
almost all the world’s opium is produced (Stewart, 
2008: 16).
In a vicious cycle, narcotics, corruption and 
absence of law and order are rotting the heart 
of the government and crippling the Afghan 
economy. Despite massive Western investments 
Afghanistan is close to be a ‘failed state’ (Steward, 
2008: 16). Weak government, corruption and 
lack of development has fuelled disillusionment 
among the Afghans especially in Pashtuns many 
of whom are at present offering to fight for or 
at least offer sanctuary to the Taliban (Rashid, 
2008: 19). 
Conclusion
To conclude, Taliban, a Pashtun Islamic 
Jihadi movement that rose in Afghanistan from 
the madrasas of Pakistan and ruled Afghanistan 
between 1996 and 2001, was mainly a reaction 
to the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan. The 
United States also backed Taliban against the 
Soviet forces through CIA, but after September 
11, 2001 it invaded Afghanistan with the help of 
its allies to uproot Taliban. After the US invasion, 
Taliban were routed from Afghan soil in 2001. 
A democratic government was established under 
the presidentship of Hamid Karzai. There was a 
time of peace and stability in Afghanistan after 
the establishment of democratic government. 
But since 2006 the incidents reveal that Taliban 
is again gaining strength which is dangerous 
for Afghanistan and for the whole South Asia 
region as well. Diverse forces including poppy 
cultivation, Pak military and the ISI, Pakistani 
madrasas, weak US policy, supply of illegal 
arms and the lack of a strong political authority 
in Afghanistan are contributing to Taliban’s 
resurgence. Present situation of Afghanistan is 
very critical. Security is declining with Taliban 
again becoming active, the opium production 
is increasing. Masses are losing their patience 
due to the presence of foreign security forces 
and Karzai’s inability to improve their daily 
lives. Afghans consider President Karzai as a 
‘puppet’ of the United States. Apart from this, 
the US has also failed to put Afghanistan back 
on track. The resurgence reflects the failure 
of NATO forces. There is a need to take some 
serious steps to rebuild Afghanistan. The US 
and its allies should not increase troop numbers. 
This may inflame Afghan nationalism due to 
the Afghans’ anti-foreign attitude. Taliban had 
itself gained support by portraying itself as 
fighting for Islam and Afghanistan against the 
‘foreign military occupation’. In the nutshell, 
the US should reconsider the actors and factors 
which are responsible for resurgence of Taliban. 
And it should undertake processes of peace, 
reconstruction and development. 
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Возрождение талибов
Доктор Сунил Кумар
Отделение стратегических и региональных исследований,
Университет штата Джамму
Джамму-180 006-Джамму и Кашмир, Индия
Талибан, движение афганских пуштунов, имеющее трансграничные присоединения, правил 
Афганистаном в период между 1996 и 2001 гг. После событий сентября 2001 года американские 
военные лишили его власти, что отразилось на снижении политической и военной мощи 
талибов. Тем не менее, существующий политико-военный сценарий Афганистана показывает, 
что талибы снова обрели силу и представляют собой серьезную проблему для США и сил 
их коалиции. Различные национальные и транснациональные факторы и силы, например, 
выращивание мака, пакистанские военные, Межведомственная разведка (МВР) и медресе, 
слабая и несовершенная политика США, незаконные поставки оружия и слабое афганское 
правительство, сыграли решающую роль в его возрождении.
Ключевые слова: Талибан, возрождение, движение, медресе, Афганистан.
